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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920264-CA
Priority No. 2

EDWARD H. JAMES,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Repl. Vol.)
provides this Court's jurisdiction over this non-capital, non-first
degree felony criminal conviction from the district court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Does the Federal Constitution require the suppression of
Mr. James' pre- and post-Miranda admissions?
2. Does the Utah Constitution require the suppression of
Mr. James' pre- and post-Miranda admissions?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
While the drafting of the trial court's written findings of
fact and conclusions of law is at issue, the facts in this case are
undisputed, allowing this Court to review the trial court's legal
conclusions as to the admissibility of Mr. James' admissions under
the correction of error standard of review.
808 P.2d 1100, 1103 (Utah App. 1990).

See State v. Sampson.

This Court owes no deference

to the court's legal conclusions, despite the fact that some of them

are couched as findings.

Id. at 1104. The voluntariness of a

confession is a question of law.
(1985).

Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104

See also State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 464 n.76 and 466

(Utah 1988) (l,/[I]t is the duty of an appellate court . . . 'to
examine the cmtire record and make and independent determination of
the ultimate issue of voluntariness.,fl; court apparently treated as
a question of law the trial court7s improper ruling admitting
statements taken in violation of Miranda)(citations omitted).

But

see Layton City v.Araaon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215-16 (Utah App.
1991)(characterizing determination as to whether the officer should
have known that his words or actions were reasonably likely to evoke
an incriminating response, and therefore should have preceded his
words or actions with Miranda warnings, as a question of fact).
Even if the "findings of fact" were actually findings of
fact, because the trial court did not draft the findings himself,
but adopted those drafted by counsel, the findings would be entitled
to less deference on review.

See Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v.

Tel-Tech. Inc.. 780 P.2d 1258, 1263 (Utah 1989)(Zimmerman, J.,
concurring), cited with approval in State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd..
786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appemdix 1 to this brief contains the full text of:
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7 (1991 Repl. Vol.)
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 12 (1991 Repl. Vol.)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) (1992)
United States Constitution, Amendment V
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV section 1.
-2 -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Mr. James with one count of burglary, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, section
76-6-202 (1990 Repl. Vol.)/ and one count of theft, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-404 (1990 Repl.
Vol.), for events allegedly occurring on March 28, 1991 (R. 7-8).
After the preliminary hearing the magistrate found probable cause to
support both charges, and bound the case over to district court (R.
2-3) .
The trial court denied Mr. James7 motions to suppress his
custodial statements to the police (R. 87; 108-109).

Mr. James then

entered a Sery plea to one count of attempted burglary, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-202 (1990
Repl. Vol.), and Utah Code Ann. section 76-4-101 (1990 Repl.
Vol.)(R. 114-120).

This plea was explicitly conditioned on Mr.

James7 right to appeal the trial court's denials of the motions to
suppress under the Utah and Federal Constitutions (R. 114). As part
of the plea bargain, the State agreed to affirmatively recommend
sentencing as though the plea were to a class A misdemeanor, and Mr.
James agreed to pay restitution.
Judge Rokich sentenced Mr. James on February 10, 1992 to a
prison term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, and
ordered him to pay fines and recoupment for his representation (R.
123).

The court then suspended the prison sentence, placing Mr.

James on probation for three years (R. 124).

-3 -

At the hearing in which Mr. James entered his conditional
Sery plea, the State agreed that the confession was integral to the
State's case, and that the State would dismiss the case if the
court's suppression ruling were reversed (T. 32).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. James was arrested on March 28, 1991, for a burglary
that occurred that same night (T. 5). The booking sheet indicates
that Mr. Jam€>s was booked by Officer Kassapakis and searched by
Officer Cogburn (R. 10). The pretrial sheet indicates charges of
burglary and theft (R. 9).
The day after the booking, Detective Newren and Detective
Cheever, apparently both Caucasian males, one of whom had eleven
years' experience on the force, and both of whom were apparently
considerably older than Mr. James, interrogated Mr. James in the old
booking area of the jail, which is currently used for
interrogations, not booking (T. 2, R. 93). Mr. James, a Native
American, was eighteen years old at that time (R. 10). At Detective
Newren's request, a jailer called Mr. James out of his cell and
brought him downstairs to the room that used to be the mugshot and
fingerprinting station, an old room which measures twelve by fifteen
feet (T. 2-3). Detective Cheever did not direct anyone to inform
Mr. James as to why he was being taken from his cell to the room
downstairs (T. 19). The interrogation began at 10:15 a.m. (T. 6).
The interrogation was not recorded (R. 70).
Detective Newren first informed Mr. James that the
-4 -

detectives were the detectives investigating the burglary which had
occurred at 355 North, 700 West, #3 (T. 3, 9). Without informing
Mr. James of his Miranda rights, the detectives proceeded to
question Mr. James (T. 9). Detective Newren asked Mr. James his
name, his date of birth, his birth place, his living arrangements,
and his job (T. 4). As the pretrial screening sheet reflects, Mr.
James' "living arrangements" were residence in Apartment #2 at 355
North, 700 West, which is apparently very near to the scene of the
burglary and theft (355 North, 700 West, #3)(R. 9). The booking
sheet reflects that Mr. James was arrested at apartment #2 at this
location (R. 10). During the evidentiary hearing on the motion to
suppress, the trial court recognized that the detectives had access
to the booking sheet prior to their interrogation of Mr. James (T.
21) .
Prior to his receipt of Miranda warnings and waiver of
rights, Mr. James admitted to the burglary (T. 5, 13, 15, R. 27, 70,
73, 85).
According to Detective Cheever, at "a point, basically"
(prosecutor's phrasing), Detective Newren informed Mr. James of his
Miranda rights (T. 16). Detective Cheever indicated that after the
first question in the Miranda admonition, Mr. James indicated that
he understood his rights, and then asked the detectives what would
happen (T. 17). The detective indicated that he told Mr. James that
they wanted to get his side of the story and asked him if he would
give it to them, and that Mr. James said yes (T. 17). Detective
Cheever then asked, "Having these rights in mind, do you want to
-5 -

talk to us now?", and Mr. James said "Yes." (T. 17).
Detective Cheever testified that he used no physical force,
no deception, and no intimidation (T. 17-18).

Detective Cheever

indicated that Mr. James responded in English, appeared to have all
his faculties, and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs
(T. 18). Detective Newren opined that Mr. James7 responses to the
questions were voluntary, and indicated that he did not use any
force, deception, artifice or measure of intimidation that he was
aware of (T. 9-10).
At the preliminary hearing, Detective Cheever testified
that they informed Mr. James that they were investigating the
burglary and then proceeded to ask him some "clarifying" questions
prior to the Miranda warnings, because of the "unusualness" of Mr.
James' name (Edward James) and date of birth (June 6, 1972)(R. 72).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
After a vague oral ruling by the trial court, the State
drafted findings of fact and conclusions of law, which address
issues never squarely addressed by the trial court, and which were
not supported by the detectives' testimony, or by the trial court's
oral findings following the detectives' testimony.

In signing those

findings over the objection of defense counsel, the trial court
abdicated his judicial role, and clearly erred.
Under federal standards recognized in Pennsylvania v Muniz,
496 U.S. 582 (1990), the detectives should have recorded the
interrogation, and owed Mr. James Miranda warnings at the outset of

-6 -

the interrogation.

The coercive and improper circumstances of the

interrogation require the suppression of all of Mr. James'
statements, under principles recognized in Oregon v. Elstad, 470
U.S. 298 (1985).
Under the Utah Constitution, the detectives should have
recorded the interrogation, informed Mr. James of his Miranda rights
at the outset of the interrogation, and honored those rights.
Suppression is the appropriate remedy.

The Elstad case is

inconsistent with prior Utah Constitutional caselaw, and this Court
should reject it on state constitutional grounds.

ARGUMENT
I.
IN FAILING TO ARTICULATE HIS RULING
AND IN SIGNING THE STATE'S FINDINGS OF FACT,
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR.
To the extent that this Court needs to refer to the trial
court's analysis,1 it is important to note that the trial court's
written findings of fact and conclusions of law are incongruent with
the trial court's oral findings,2 and with the evidence.

After

1. See Sampson, supra at 1 (when facts are undisputed,
Court reviews legal conclusions, even those couched as "findings,"
for correctness).
2. Reference to oral rulings outside the written findings
of fact and conclusions of law is proper practice. See e.g. Erwin
v. Erwin. 773 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 1989)("In assessing the
sufficiency of the findings [in a domestic bench trial], ... we are
not confined to the contents of a particular document entitled
"Findings"; rather, the findings may be expressed orally from the
bench or contained in other documents, such as the quite thorough
memorandum decision of the trial court in this case.")(footnotes,
citing inter alia Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), omitted).
-7 -

discussing the legal inadequacy of the written findings and
conclusions, Mr. James will marshall the evidence.
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the
trial court rejected the State's argument that the police were
attempting to ascertain Mr. James7 identity at the outset of the
interrogation, finding that the detectives already had access to all
of the identification information on the booking sheet, and that the
detectives' purpose was to obtain a confession (T. 19-22).

The

trial court took the motion under advisement, indicating the court's
inclination to suppress the statements, but waiting to rule until
after the court reviewed the cases presented by the State in
opposition to suppression, Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582
(1990), and Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (R. 24-33).3
A copy of the trial court's oral findings at this hearing
is in Appendix 2.
At the next hearing, the court announced that despite the
court's discomfort with the ruling, the case was controlled by the
State's "cases.11

The trial court felt that the police should have

given Mr. James his Miranda warnings before the interrogation, but

3. As is discussed more fully infra, the minority Muniz
opinion recognized an exception to the Miranda doctrine, allowing
police to ask "routine booking questions" without informing a
suspect of his Miranda rights. The majority of the court either did
not reach or rejected the "routine booking questions" exception.
Elstad. discussed infra, indicates that statements taken after the
receipt and waiver of Miranda warnings are not necessarily tainted
by prior statements taken in violation of Miranda.

-8 -

indicated Mr. James' "statement" was voluntary and admissible (T.2
1-2).

The court indicated that he would write a memorandum opinion

(T.2 2), but simply signed the findings and conclusions prepared by
the State without any further articulation of the court's own ruling.
The trial court's oral ruling at the second hearing is
unclear in two respects.

First, the ruling does not indicate which

of the State's cases justify the admission of the evidence.

If the

court was relying on Elstad and Bishop,4 as it appears from the
ruling at the second hearing (T.2 1), the court recognized a Miranda
violation, and did not intend to justify the interrogation under the
Muniz routine booking questions exception to Miranda.

However, it

is possible that the court was relying on Elstad and the minority
Muniz opinion, the opinions asserted most vigorously by the State at
the first hearing, and thus recognized no Miranda violation.
Second, the ruling is unclear as to what "statement" of Mr. James is
admissible.

If the court was ruling under the Muniz minority

opinion and Elstad, it appears that the court intended for both the
pre- and post-Miranda statements to be admissible.

If the court was

ruling under Elstad and Bishop, it appears that the court intended
for only the post-Miranda statements to be admissible.
A copy of the trial court's ruling at this hearing is in
Appendix 3.

4. State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), discusses the
Elstad case, id, 753 P.2d at 465-66, but has nothing to do with the
Muniz minority's routine booking questions exception to Miranda.
See supra n.3.

-9 -

Over the written objections of defense counsel (R. 81-83),
the trial court signed the State's findings and conclusions, which
indicate that police have no obligation to inform a suspect of his
rights under the Miranda decision during routine booking
questioning, that the detectives in this case were merely seeking to
establish Mr. James' identity and did not owe him Miranda warnings
prior to his admission, and that if the pre-Miranda statements were
suppressible, there is no constitutional requirement of suppression
of the post-Miranda statements (R. 84-87).

A copy of the findings

and conclusions is in Appendix 4.
Under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), 5 it is the duty
of the trial courts to find the facts necessary to the courts'
decisions.6

This Court has previously articulated the trial courts'

fact finding duties, explaining,
This court requires that findings of fact
(1) include enough facts to disclose the process
through which the ultimate conclusion is reached,
(2) indicate that the process is logical and
properly supported, and (3) not be clearly
erroneous.
Hardv v. Hardy. 776 P.2d 917, 923 (Utah App. 1989).

5. The rule applies in criminal cases.
763 P.2d 786, 787 n.2 (Utah 1988).

State v. Goodman,

6. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(c) also requires,
A motion made before trial shall be determined
before trial unless the court for good cause
orders that the ruling be deferred for later
determination. Where factual issues are involved
in determining a motion, the court shall state
its findings on the record.

-10-

In Automatic Control Prods. Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 780
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989), Justice Zimmerman wrote a concurring opinion
which is cited with approval in the unanimous State v. Rio Vista
Oil. Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990), case.

His concurring

Automatic Control opinion indicates that trial courts must
articulate the bases for their rulings, and that they must closely
scrutinize findings drafted by counsel.

Id at 1261-1262. His

opinion further indicates that reviewing courts pay counsel-drafted
findings less deference than those drafted by courts.

Id.

opinion states,
The findings of facts "is an important part
of the judicial function," one that is designed
to flesh out the rationale for the decision and
one that "the judge cannot surrender ... to
counsel." As the United States Supreme Court has
noted, findings of fact prepared by the court are
"drawn with the insight of a disinterested mind"
and are "more helpful to the appellate court" and
are "more helpful to the appellate court" than
those prepared by counsel. It is for this reason
that the federal courts appear to have almost
uniformly adopted the rule that while findings
prepared by counsel are sufficient under the
federal analogue to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure
52, appellate courts "will feel freer in close
cases to disregard a finding or remand for
further findings if the trial court did not
prepare them him [or her] self."
I know that I apply a similar standard in
reviewing findings prepared by counsel, and I
suspect that other members of the Court do the
same, although to my knowledge, we have never
said so. In light of this fact and the rule
stated above, trial courts would be well advised
to be vigilant in guarding against the tendency
to view findings as a detail to be dealt with as
expeditiously as possible, rather than as a
fundamental part of the decisional process, one
that goes to the heart of its integrity. In the
same vein, counsel preparing proposed findings
and conclusions should be cautious lest in their
-11-

The

zeal, they inc[l]ude proposals that may undermine
the integrity of the judgment they hope to obtain.
Id at 1261-1262.
In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651
(1964), the Court quoted Judge Skelly Wright of the D. C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, as follows:
"I suggest to you [trial courts] strongly
that you avoid as far as you possibly can simply
signing what some lawyer puts under your nose.
These lawyers, and properly so, in their zeal and
advocacy and their enthusiasm are going to state
the case for their side in these findings as
strongly as they possibly can. When these
findings get to the courts of appeals they won't
be worth the paper they are written on as far as
assisting the court of appeals in determining why
the judge decided the case." Seminars for Newly
Appointed United States District Judges (1963),
p. 166.
U. S. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.. 376 U.S. 651, 656 n.4 (1964).
In the instant case, in failing to adequately articulate
his ruling, cind in signing the State's findings and conclusions
which conflicted with the court's oral findings and reached issues
never previously addressed by the trial court, the trial court
abdicated his judicial responsibilities, discussed above.
The key disparity between the court's oral findings and
those drafted by the State is that the trial court stated on the
record at the evidentiary hearing that the police were not seeking
to verify Mr. James' identity at the outset of the interrogation
when the police already had the identification information on the
booking sheet, but were seeking to obtain a confession (T. 19-22),
while the written findings indicate that "[t]he detectives then
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asked the defendant general questions about his identity for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the correct person was being
interviewed." (R. 85). The distinction is key to whether a Miranda
violation occurred under federal standards, discussed infra.

In

justifying the admission of the evidence under the routine booking
question doctrine, the findings rely on a doctrine that has not been
adopted by a majority of the United States Supreme Court, and
address an issue that was inconsistent with the trial court's
factual findings at the evidentiary hearing, and never squarely
addressed by the court thereafter.
Because the trial court abdicated his judicial
responsibilities in signing the findings submitted by counsel, this
Court owes no deference to the written findings.
Natural Gas, supra.

Cjf. El Paso

The only true factual finding made by the trial

court, to which this Court should defer, is the trial court's oral
finding that when the detectives began the interrogation of Mr.
James, it was their purpose to obtain a confession, rather than to
obtain the identification information which the detectives already
had (T. 19-22).
As a general rule, "[a]n appellant raising issues of fact
on appeal must, under Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a), marshall all the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings, and show that evidence to be
insufficient."
1991).

State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724, 734 (Utah App.

Because the facts in this case are undisputed, allowing a

correction of error analysis under Sampson, supra at 1, and because
the trial court's written findings of fact are legally inadequate,
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it appears that marshalling the evidence may be unnecessary in this
case.7

However, marshalling the evidence does demonstrate clear

errors in the trial court's written findings of fact and conclusions
of law.
The court's written conclusions indicate that the
detectives were "merely requesting biographical data to assure the
interviewing detectives that they were about to question the right
suspect." (R. 87). The trial court's oral conclusions indicate that
the detectives' purpose when they questioned Mr. James was not to
verify Mr. James' identity, but was to obtain a confession (T. 20,
21) .
The evidence squares with the trial court's oral findings

7. In Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1991),
this Court explained,
"The process of marshaling the evidence
serves the important function of reminding
litigants and appellate courts of the broad
deference owed to the fact finder at trial."
How€*ver, we will only grant this deference when
the findings of fact are sufficiently detailed to
disclose the evidentiary basis for the court's
decision. There is, in effect, no need for an
appellant to marshal the evidence when the
findings are so inadequate that they cannot be
meaningfully challenged as factual
determinations. In other words, the way to
attack findings which appear to be complete and
which are sufficiently detailed is to marshal the
supporting evidence and then demonstrate the
evidence is inadequate to sustain such findings.
But where the findings are not of that caliber,
appellant need not go through a futile
marshalling exercise. Rather, appellant can
simply argue the legal insufficiency of the
court's findings as framed.
Id. at 477-478 (citations omitted).
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that the detectives were not attempting to verify Mr. James7
identity at the outset of the interview, but were interrogating him
to get a confession.

Detective Newren indicated that the detectives

began the interview by informing Mr. James that they were there to
investigate the burglary at 355 North on 700 West #3 (T. 3), the
apartment which is apparently near to the apartment listed as Mr.
James' residence on the pretrial screening sheet, 355 North 700
West, #2 (R. 9). He indicated that it was his intention to ask Mr.
James about the burglary (T. 7). He never testified that the
questions at the outset of the interview, including Mr. James'
"living arrangements" were posed to verify Mr. James' identity.
Detective Cheever testified that Mr. James was informed that they
were in the interview room to investigate the burglary (T. 12).
Detective Cheever never testified that the questions at the outset
of the interview were posed to verify Mr. James' identity.
A portion of the preliminary hearing transcript was in the
district court pleadings file, and the trial court had read it (T.
8).

In this transcript, Detective Newren testified that prior to

the Miranda warnings the detectives asked Mr. James some
"identification" questions (R. 70), and then indicated that the
questions were "[c]larifying his name and different things like
that, because of the unusualness of the Edward and the James and
date of birth." (R. 72). There is nothing unusual about Edward
James7 name and date of birth.

If the detectives were really

clarifying these "unusual" facts, there would have been no need for
their additional questions about his current living arrangements,
-15-

his jobf his employment, and what he did for a living (R. 73). Even
if this testimony were true, that the detectives were clarifying Mr.
James unusual name and birthdate, it does not support the trial
court's written finding that "[t]he detectives then asked the
defendant general questions about his identity for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the correct person was being interviewed." (R.
85)(emphasis added).
The trial court's oral findings that the detectives were
interrogating Mr. James with the intent to obtain a confession,
rather than seeking to verify his identity, were correct.

The

written "finding" to the contrary is without any evidentiary support
and clearly erroneous.
The trial court's written findings include the following
version of the admissions, "Detective Cheever questioned the
defendant about his present employment to which the defendant
responded that he was presently unemployed, and then, after a pause,
volunteered that during times when he was unemployed was when he got
into trouble, that this is when he gets things into his head and
does them, and admitted to the burglary." (R. 85)(emphasis added).
There is nothing in evidence to support the emphasized
portion of this version of events. According to Detective Cheever,
Mr. James indicated that he was not working, and then said "at that
point that he got the idea in his head and that he did it, he went
into a neighbor's house and took a coat and stereo, and they found
it." (T. 15). At the preliminary hearing, relevant portions of
which transcript were presented in the district court file,
-16-

Detective Newren testified that it was after the detectives asked
Mr. James about the burglary that he stated that he "sometimes gets
things in his head and that he had done the burglary and gone
through the window."

(R. 70). On cross-examination at the

preliminary hearing, Detective Newren said that the admission came
after Detective Cheever asked Mr. James about what he does for a
living (R. 73). It appears that the quotation included in the
findings and conclusions comes from Detective Newren's police
report, which was not placed in evidence, but which was provided to
defense counsel in discovery.

Regardless of the source of the

quotation, it is not supported by the evidence, and the finding
including the quotation is clearly erroneous.
The last written "finding" (which is really a legal
conclusion) is also clearly erroneous.

It states, "No coercion or

deception of any kind was exercised by the Detectives in order to
induce the defendant to speak with the police." (R. 86). On the
contrary.

As is discussed infra, numerous facts before the trial

court demonstrate the coercive tactics employed by the detectives,
including the incommunicado, unrecorded interrogation occurring in
the small, old booking room at the jail, wherein two older and
experienced Caucasian detectives questioned a young Native American,
without giving him timely Miranda warnings.
interrogation is inherently coercive."
1100, 1103 n.6 (citing Miranda).
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"[C]ustodial

State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d

Under the governing law, the trial court's findings are
clearly erroneous and should be reversed.

State v. Jackson. 805

P.2d 765, 766 (Utah App. 1990)("A finding is clearly erroneous if it
is without adequate evidentiary support or is induced by an
erroneous view of the law.); State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272
(Utah App. 1990)("The trial court's factual determinations are
clearly erroneous only if in conflict with the clear weight of the
evidence, or if this court has a 'definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made./n)(citations omitted); State v. Arroyo, 796
P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990)(to withstand appellate review, trial
court's finding of fact must be supported by substantial, competent
evidence; prosecutor's argument does not constitute evidence to
support a finding).

II.
MR. JAMES' STATEMENTS SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED
AS A MATTER OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself[.]"
As a common law protection of the exercise of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, the United States
Supreme Court set forth some general guidelines in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Under Miranda, if the State wishes to

present in evidence statements which stem from custodial
interrogation, the State bears a "heavy" burden to show that prior
to the statements, the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights,
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and made a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of those rights
before making the statement in issue.
444-445.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at

The Court designated the following information to be given

to the person prior to custodial interrogation: "that he has a right
to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed."

Id. at 444.

It is the State's burden to show, by at least a
preponderance of the evidence, that confessions are voluntary under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 463 (Utah 1988).

State

The defendant is entitled

to a "reliable and clear-cut" determination as to whether the
confession was voluntary under the totality of circumstances.
(citation omitted).

Id.

Voluntariness is a question of law, involving

this Court's assessment of the "characteristics of the accused and
the details of the interrogation."

State v. Singer. 815 P.2d 1303,

1309-1320 (Utah App. 1991)(citations omitted).
government agents are key to the analysis.

Coercive tactics of

Id. at 1310-1311.

Statements taken in violation of Miranda are not ordinarily
presumed to taint subsequent statements obtained after Miranda
warnings, if the pre-Miranda statements were not otherwise coerced.
Oregon V. Elstad. 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985).

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in part, "No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
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of the laws."

The Fourteenth Amendment requires suppression of

confessions obtained through police misconduct.

The due process

aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment claim is explained in Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), as follows:
The abhorrence of society to the use of
involuntary confessions does not turn alone on
their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns
on the deeprooted feeling that the police must
obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the
end life and liberty can be as much endangered
from illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as from the actual
criminals themselves.
Id. at 321. See also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-11
(1985)(confessions admitted in state and federal courts must be
voluntary under the Fourteenth Amendment, must have been obtained by
government compliance with due process).

A. THE DETECTIVES SHOULD HAVE RECORDED THE INTERROGATION.
It is the duty of the courts to insure that custodial
interrogation is legal, and absent an adequate record, the courts
are in no position to fulfill this duty.

See State v. Bishop, 753

P.2d 439, 464 n.76 (Utah 1988)(M/[I]t is the duty of an appellate
court . . . 'to examine the entire record and make and independent
determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness.'")(citations
omitted).

When the record of custodial interrogations is

inadequate, the State is responsible.
The Miranda Court explained why the burden is on the State
to show that the Miranda rights are given and waived in a knowing
and voluntary manner, stating,
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If the interrogation continues without the
presence of an attorney and a statement is taken,
a heavy burden rests on the government to
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel. This Court has always set
high standards of proof for the waiver of
constitutional rights, and we re-assert these
standards as applied to in-custody
interrogation. Since the State is responsible
for establishing the isolated circumstances under
which the interrogation takes place and has the
only means of making available corroborated
evidence of warnings given during incommunicado
interrogation, the burden is rightly on its
shoulders.
Miranda. 384 U.S. at 475 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
As is explained below, in circumstances wherein the police
unjustifiably fail to record incommunicado interrogations and
present an unclear picture as to the circumstances of the
interrogations, the State cannot meet its "heavy" burden of proof in
demonstrating the receipt and waiver of Miranda rights, or of
proving by at least a preponderance of the evidence that the
statements were given voluntarily.

Due process requires suppression

of such statements allegedly made but not recorded.
In State v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989), the Utah
Supreme Court recognized that when the State presents supposed
confessions without an adequate means of recording them, courts are
not in a position to assess whether the defendant's rights have been
violated or protected.

Carter, 776 P.2d at 891.

In Carter, the defendant's confession was dictated by a
police officer, who stopped every few lines for the defendant's
approval, and later obtained the defendant's signature on the
-21-

confession.

The police obtained a written waiver of the defendant's

Miranda rights prior to the confession.

The court rejected Mr.

Carter's claims that the manner of recording his confession denied
him his rights, relying, in part, on the fact that the defendant had
made two incriminating statements to other witnesses which
substantially parallelled the confession.

Id. at 890.

Before leaving this issue, however, the court explained
that police are responsible to provide reliable proof of the
circumstances surrounding custodial interrogations, stating,
While we hold that admission of the
confession was not prejudicial error, we do not
sanction the particular manner in which it was
recorded in this case. In Bishop, that
defendant's confession, togsither with statements
made by the police officers, was recorded
verbatim. This process not only helped insure
that the defendant's confession was not coerced,
but also provided both the trial court and this
court with the correct tools for effectively and
efficiently reviewing the defendant's
contentions, as well as the totality of the
circumstances of his confession. Such a process
guarantees that constitutional rights are
protected and justice is effected. Nevertheless,
while the dictation process that occurred in this
case could conceivably amount, in other
instances, to deprivation of a defendant's
constitutional rights, that was not the case here.
Id. at 891.
The record contains no explanation for why the detectives
chose not to record the interrogation of Mr. James.

The record

demonstrates that the detectives are not reliable sources for the
fact sensitive analyses required in assessing Mr. James'
statements.

For instance, the record contains several different

versions of Mr. James' first incriminating statement and the
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circumstances in which it was made, all of which versions were
provided by the two detectives who initiated the interrogation and
chose not to record it.

According to Detective Cheever, Mr. James

indicated that he was not working, and then said "at that point that
he got the idea in his head and that he did it, he went into a
neighbor's house and took a coat and stereo, and they found it." (T.
15).

However, at the preliminary hearing, Detective Newren

testified that it was after the detectives asked Mr. James about the
burglary that he stated that he "sometimes gets things in his head
and that he had done the burglary and gone through the window."
70).

(R.

On cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, Detective

Newren said that the admission came after Detective Cheever asked
Mr. James about what he does for a living (R. 73). The State's
memorandum indicates, "In regard to Detective Cheever asking the
defendant about his employment, the defendant stated he was not
working at the time, then paused, and added, 'that this is when he
got into trouble,' ... 'at such times, he gets things into his head
and does them" and admitted to the burglary.'" (R. 27)(emphasis
added).

This same version appears in the the trial court's

post-hearing written findings (R. 85). It appears that this
quotation comes from Detective Newren's police report, which was not
placed in evidence, but which was provided to defense counsel in
discovery.
The detectives' inability to establish this most critical
piece of evidence for their own case counsels against relying on
these detectives for proof that they respected Mr. James' rights.
-23-

See Shiflet v. State, 752 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985)("[0]ral
confessions of guilt, or oral admissions against interest, made by
one in custody are inadmissible evidence because they are so liable
to be misunderstood, so easily fabricated, and so hard to be
contradicted.11) (citations omitted) .
The Miranda and Carter decisions have been around long
enough for the detectives to have known that they had the obligation
to make a reliable record of any supposed confession obtained
through this isolated interrogation of this young Native American.
The detectives' failure to record the interrogation demonstrates
police misconduct, in violation of Mr. James' right to due process
of law.

See Spano, supra.

The detectives' failure to record the

interrogation has resulted in an unreliable record for judicial
review of the legality of the circumstances of the custodial
interrogation, and demonstrates that the State has failed to carry
its burden to demonstrate that Mr. James' made a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights, and gave his statements
voluntarily.

In these circumstances, suppression is appropriate.

See Miranda. Carter. Bishop. Shiflet. and Spano. supra.

See also

Morris v. State. 603 P.2d 1157, 1158-1160 (Okl. Cr. 1979)(unrecorded
confession should have been suppressed because record of
circumstances reflected violation of defendant's rights, and
apparently because of blatant government misconduct in failing to
adequately record and produce a record of the circumstances of the
confession).
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B. UNDER MUNIZ. THE DETECTIVES OWED MR. JAMES A MIRANDA WARNING, AND
SHOULD HAVE SOUGHT A WAIVER OF MR. JAMES7 RIGHTS AT THE OUTSET OF
THE INTERROGATION.
Under federal law, Miranda warnings are required prior to
"custodial interrogation."

State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1104.

The State conceded in the trial court that Mr. James was in
custody (R. 30). It appears that the State may have conceded that
Mr. James was subjected to "interrogation," during the argument at
the hearing on the motion to suppress under the federal
constitution, when the prosecutor stated,
The issue in this case is whether or not there
was interrogation. The issue in this case is
Miranda. The issue in this case is neither
custody nor interrogation. The issue in this
case is whether the delayed Miranda admonition
rendered the post-Miranda Statement involuntary.
(T. 27).
The court's written conclusions indicate indirectly that
Mr. James was in custody (R. 86), but appear to indicate that Mr.
James was not subjected to interrogation when the detectives were
"merely requesting biographical data to assure the interviewing
detectives that they were about to question the right suspect." (R.
87).

The conclusions also indicate, "The police are not required to

give Miranda admonitions to a defendant who is in custody prior to
asking routine booking questions which the police have no reason to
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response."
(R. 86-87.

However, the conclusions vacillate as to whether

interrogation occurred, indicating, "even if the unwarned statements
resulted from interrogation within the meaning of Miranda, there is
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no constitutional requirement that this Court suppress the
defendant's post-Miranda statements."1 (R. 87).
As previously noted, these written conclusions conflict
with the trial court's oral ruling and clear evidence that the
police were not seeking to verify Mr* James7 identity, but were
seeking a confession.
The trial court's legal conclusions are incorrect as a
matter of law, as well.

Under federal law, there are two separate

ways to establish "interrogation."
constitutes interrogation.

First, express (questioning

Second, words or actions that the police

should know would reasonably lead to incriminating responses
constitute a "functional equivalent" of interrogation.

E.g. Rhode

Island v. Innis. 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 (1980); Pennsylvania v.
Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600-01 (1990)(plurality); Arizona v. Mauro, 481
U.S. 520, 526 (1987).8

The trial court's conclusions overlook the

fact that the express questions in this case constitute actual
interrogation, and do not require analysis of whether the police had
reason to know they would elicit an incriminating response, the
functional equivalent of interrogation inquiry.

8. In Layton City v. Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah App.
1991), the Court listed federal circuit court opinions for the
proposition that "an express question from police to a suspect does
not amount to interrogation if, under the circumstances, the
question was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response." JId. at 1215. These cases, like the trial court in the
instant case, improperly confuse the two separate ways of showing
interrogation: 1) express questioning (actual interrogation), or 2)
words or actions that an officer should know are reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response (functional equivalent of
interrogation). See Muniz, Mauro, Innis, supra.
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Even if the functional equivalent of interrogation
definition were applicable to the direct questions asked in this
case, the questions would constitute interrogation.

At the time of

the interrogation in this case, Mr. James was in custody in the
jail, facing charges of burglary and theft, which charges were the
subject of the detectives' interrogation.

The detectives had him

brought to an isolated area in the jail, announced that they were
investigating the burglary at 355 North 700 West #3, and proceeded
to ask him questions.

In this case, where Mr. James was accused of

committing a burglary and theft at 355 North 700 West #3, his
revelation of information such as his "current living arrangements"
at 355 North 700 West #2 (R. 9, the pretrial services screening
sheet reflecting this as his address, R. 10, the booking sheet
reflecting this as the location of Mr. James' arrest), was
incriminating.

The detectives should have known that their words

and actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response.

See Lavton City v. Aracron, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah App.

1991)("The likelihood of incrimination must be determined from all
of the circumstances; the same question may constitute interrogation
in one situation but not in another.

For example, in United States

v. Poole. 794 F.2d 462, 466-67, amended in 806 F.2d 853 (9th
Cir.1986), the court noted that asking for name, date of birth, and
similar routine biographical data is ordinarily not an
interrogation, but it was interrogation when asked immediately after
showing a bank robbery suspect surveillance photos of the robbery
and mentioning his accomplice by name.").
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The trial court's written conclusions indicating that
police have no obligation to inform suspects of their Miranda rights
prior to asking them routine booking questions or questions about
biographical data, are apparently conclusions drawn from Justice
Brennan's minority opinion in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582
(1990).

Justice Marshall persuasively rejected the "routine booking

questions" exception, 496 U.S. 608-626, and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices White, Blackmun and Stevens did not reach the question,
496 U.S. 606-608. The State apparently overlooked the fact that the
"routine booking questions" exception was not adopted by a majority
of the Court in Muniz, for the State cited Muniz in arguing to the
trial court as follows: "However, the United States Supreme Court
has recently affirmed the 'routine booking question' exception which
exempts from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the biographical
data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services." (R. 30).
The State's courtesy copy of Muniz in the district court file
contains the full minority opinion, and the full concurring opinion,
but omits Justice Marshall's dissenting and concurring opinion.
Even if Muniz were a majority opinion, it would not apply
to the facts of this case, where the detectives were not booking Mr.
James or fulfilling some other administrative duty, but were seeking
a confession to the crime that they were investigating, and were
asking questions that were incriminating.

For example, the

detectives informed Mr. James that they were there to investigate
the burglary that occurred at 355 North 700 West, Apartment #3 (T.
3), and then asked him what his "living arrangements" were (T. 4 ) ,
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when the pretrial services screening sheet and booking sheet already
indicated that Mr. James lived in and was arrested in apartment #2
at that very address of the crime that the detectives were
investigating (R. 9, 10). As the trial court originally concluded,
the officers already had the identification information available to
them on the booking sheet, and were seeking a confession (T.
19-22).

In these circumstances, the "routine booking questions"

exception would not apply.

See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601-02 and n.14

(to qualify under "routine booking questions" exception, questions
must be reasonably related to administrative duties such as booking
and pretrial services screening; designedly incriminating booking
questions require Miranda warnings).
In directly questioning Mr. James while he was in custody
for charges of burglary and theft, the detectives conducted
custodial interrogation, which should have been preceded by a
Miranda warning and waiver of rights.

The detectives' duty to

inform Mr. James of his Miranda rights at the outset of the
interrogation is reinforced by the fact that the officers should
have known that their words and actions were reasonably likely to
elicit incriminating responses from Mr. James.

The detectives'

failure to give the Miranda warnings in a timely fashion calls for
suppression of the pre-Miranda statements.

Miranda.

C. THE COERCIVE AND IMPROPER NATURE OF THE INTERROGATION REQUIRES
THE SUPPRESSION OF ALL OF MR. JAMES' STATEMENTS UNDER PRINCIPLES
RECOGNIZED IN THE ELSTAD OPINION.
The trial court7s findings and conclusions indicate that
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there was no coercion involved in the interrogation of Mr, James,
and that his statements to the detectives were all voluntary (R.
86) . The conclusions indicate that even if Mr. James' pre-Miranda
statements were taken in violation of Mr. James' Miranda rights,
"there is no constitutional requirement that this Court suppress the
defendant's post-Miranda statements." (R. 87). The trial court's
conclusion is apparently based on Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298
(1985), the case most consistently asserted by the State (e.g. R.
41-46).
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Court held,
[A] suspect who has once responded to unwarned
yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby
disabled from waiving his rights and confessing
after he has been given the requisite Miranda
warnings.
Id, at 318. The Court indicated further,
[A]bsent deliberately coercive or improper
tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the
mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned
admission does not warrant a presumption of
compulsion. A subsequent administration of
Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a
voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily
should suffice to remove the conditions that
precluded admission of the earlier statement. In
such circumstances, the finder of fact may
reasonably conclude that the suspect made a
rational and intelligent choice whether to waive
or invoke his rights.
Id. at 314.
The Elstad case turned on unique facts, which led the Court
to conclude that the unwarned statements made by Mr. Elstad were not
otherwise coerced.

The Court explained,
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It is also beyond dispute that respondent's
earlier remark was voluntary, within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment. Neither the environment
nor the manner of either "interrogation" was
coercive. The initial conversation took place at
midday, in the living room area of respondent's
own home, with his mother in the kitchen area, a
few steps away. Although in retrospect the
officers testified that respondent was then in
custody, at the time he made his statement he had
not been informed that he was under arrest. The
arresting officers' testimony indicates that the
brief stop in the living room before proceeding
to the station house was not to interrogate the
suspect but to notify his mother of the reason
for his arrest.
Id. at 315.

The Court noted the Miranda violation at issue was one

conceded by the government, and thus one that the Court was
constrained to assume, jld. at 315, but indicated that the police
failure to give Miranda warnings may have been an innocent mistake,
and also noted that the police did not exploit the pre-Miranda
statement when they later obtained Mr. Elstad's waiver of his rights
at the police station, about an hour after his initial statement
made at Mr. Elstad's home.

Id.

The Court noted that Mr. Elstad may

have been prompted to waive his rights and again confess at the
station, by his father's accosting him on the way from his home to
the police station.

Id. at 314. Mr. Elstad's waiver of his Miranda

rights was recorded by the police contemporaneously, id. at 315-16,
and he was also given a typewritten copy of his second confession to
modify and sign after the interrogation, .id. at 301-02.
The Elstad Court's holding is tied in closely with the
facts of the case, and the opinion reiterates that each case must
turn on its own facts, stating,
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When police ask questions of a suspect in
custody without administering the required
warnings, Miranda dictates that the answers
received be presumed compelled and that they be
excluded from evidence at trial in the State's
case in chief. . . . We do not imply that good
faith excuses a failure to administer Miranda
warnings; nor do we condone inherently coercive
police tactics or methods offensive to due
process that render the initial admission
involuntary and undermine the suspect's will to
invoke his rights once they are read to him. A
handful of courts have, however, applied our
precedents relating to confessions obtained under
coercive circumstances to situations involving
wholly voluntary admissions, requiring a passage
of time or break in events before a second, fully
warned statement can be deemed voluntary. Far
from establishing a rigid rule, we direct courts
to avoid one; there is no warrant for presuming
coercive effect where the suspect's initial
inculpatory statement, though technically in
violation of Miranda, was voluntary. The
relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second
statement was also voluntarily made. As in any
such inquiry, the finder of fact must examine the
surrounding circumstances and the entire course
of police conduct with respect to the suspect in
evaluating the voluntariness of his statements.
Id. at 317-318.
The trial court's conclusion that Mr. James' statements
were voluntary was based on the conclusory testimony of the
detectives to this effect.

The conclusion states,

Based on the uncontradicted testimony of the
Detectives who conducted the interview that the
defendant freely volunteered the information
requested and was subjected to neither coercion,
physical or psychological, or induced to speak as
a result of promises or deception of any kind,
the Court concludes the defendant's statements
were voluntarily given under the totality of the
circumstances.
(R. 86).
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The trial court's conclusion is incorrect, in that it
relies solely on the conclusory testimony of the officers concerning
what occurred during the secluded and unrecorded interrogation, and
fails to apply well established legal precedents which demonstrate
the coercive nature of the interrogation.

See Miller v. Fenton, 474

U.S. 104, 117 (1985)(part of the reason that the voluntariness
question is a question of law, and subject to correction on appeal
without deference to the fact finder(s), is that the actual facts
involved are frequently not truly ascertainable; "critical events
surrounding the taking of a confession almost invariably occur in a
secret and inherently more coercive environment" than prevails in
open court on the record).

Defense counsel correctly argued to the

trial court that the voluntariness question was a conclusion to be
reached independently by the trial court, not the detectives (T. 9).
In assessing the voluntariness of confessions under the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has
applied a "totality of the circumstances" test, considering the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation,
including such criteria as the youth of the accused, and the lack of
advice to the accused concerning his rights.

Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 223-227 (1973).
Numerous courts have recognized that "custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive."
1100, 1103 n.6 (citing Miranda).

State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d

See also State v. Miller. 829 P.2d

132, 134 (Utah App. 1992)("[C]onfinement in jail provides a suspect
setting for coercive interrogations.")(citation omitted).
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When people such as Mr. Jamets are interrogated in the jail,
in isolated rooms without witnesses or recording devices, they are
at the mercy of the detectives and they know it.

The United States

Supreme Court has recognized that those subject to incommunicado
custodial interrogation are often aware that the interrogation will
continue until the detectives obtain the information they want, and
are often fearful that, due to the isolation of the interrogation,
they are in danger of abuse from the detectives.
Mccarty. 468 U.S. 420, 437-38 (1984).

Berkerner v.

See also Miranda, 384 U.S. at

461 ("As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated
setting of the police station may well be greater than in courts or
other officieil investigations, where there are often impartial
observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.").
The detectives in this case had Mr. James brought to an
isolated and small room in the jail where the two of them
immediately confronted him with the fact that they were there to
investigate the burglary with which Mr. James had been charged.
fact that there were two of them demonstrates coercion.

The

Ashcraft v.

Tennessee. 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Spano v. New York. 360 U.S. 315
(1959) . The fact that they isolated Mr. James from his family and
friends, and from attorneys demonstrates coercion.
Arizona. 437 U.S. 385 (1978),
coercion.

Mincey v.

Mr. James7 youth also demonstrates

Schneckcloth. supra.

Mr. James was undoubtedly aware that, in the isolated
circumstances of the interrogation, with no recording device in use,
whatever was to happen in the old booking area of the jail with the
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two detectives would occur without witnesses.

The absence of a tape

recorder or any effort to record the events in the basement of the
jail must have heightened the coercive effect of the incommunicado
interrogation.

The fact that the detectives chose to disobey State

v. Carter's clear mandate to record the interrogation demonstrates
coercion.

See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)(coercion

is demonstrated through police disregard of applicable law).
Finally, the fact that the detectives conducted custodial
interrogation without giving Mr. James timely Miranda warnings, and
the fact that one of them later claimed that their interrogation was
just "clarification" of Mr. James7 "unusual" name and birthdate,
demonstrate coercion.

Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966);

Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d
439, 465 (Utah 1988).
Under Elstad, Mr. James' involuntary pre-Miranda statements
are relevant to the voluntariness of the purported Miranda waiver,
and the post-Miranda confession.

The Court indicated that in cases

where unwarned statements are not only presumptively compelled by
virtue of police failure to give timely Miranda warnings, but are
also involuntary or products of police misbehavior, courts must
determine whether intervening events demonstrate that subsequent
Miranda waivers and statements are voluntary, and not the product of
the original involuntary statements.

In the words of the Court,

When a prior statement is actually coerced, the
time that passes between confessions, the change
in place of interrogations, and the change in
identity of the interrogators all bear on whether
that coercion has carried over into the second
confession.
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Elstad at 310.
In the instant case, the purported Miranda waiver and the
second confession followed directly after the coerced admissions.
There was nothing separating the the coerced admissions from the
waiver and subsequent confession.

The admissions combine with the

coercive factors prevailing throughout the interrogation to
demonstrate that the purported Miranda waiver and subsequent
confession were involuntary.

Under Elstad, the pre- and

post-Miranda statements made by Mr. James to the police must be
suppressed.

See also Miranda at and 475 and 476 (government bears

"heavy" burden to demonstrate knowing and voluntary waiver; "any
evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a
waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily
waive his privilege."); State v. Strain. 779 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah
1989)("Once the accused has been so advised, he has the privilege of
waiving these; rights but must do so voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently.

This is generally acknowledged as meaning that the

waiver must have been the product of a "free and deliberate choice
rather than intimidation, coercion or deception" and executed with
"full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and
[of] the consequences of the decision to abandon it.")(citations
omitted); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1108 (Utah App.
1990)("Initially we note that, though a defendant may waive his
rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during
custodial interrogation, 'these waivers must be both intentional and
made with full knowledge of the consequences and the defendant is
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given the benefit of every reasonable presumption against such a
waiver.")(citations omitted).

III.
MR. JAMES' STATEMENTS
SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED UNDER THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION.
A. THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS THE UTAH CONSTITUTION IN THIS CASE.
Defense counsel submitted a motion and memorandum arguing
that the confession should be suppressed under the Utah Constitution
(R. 92-101).

At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel

discussed various Utah cases decided under the Utah Constitution (T.
28-29).

The court ruled in a minute entry as follows: "The

defendant's motion to reconsider his motion to suppress, was
considered, and the court sustained it's original ruling.

The court

believed that confession made by the defendant was done in a
non-accusatory environment." (R. 108).
Basic tenets of federalism call for this Court to enforce
the Utah Constitution in this case.
a federation of state governments.

The United States of America is
The states preceded the

federation and hold general, residual powers to govern, which are
limited only by the state and federal constitutions.

In contrast,

the federal government's powers are limited to those enumerated in
the federal constitution.
Amendment X.

See e.g. Constitution of United States,

This federalist form of government is based on

historical distrust, fear and confinement of centralized government,
and historical trust and empowerment of local governments to
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represent and serve the citizens of each state.

See e.g. Manning v.

Sevier County. 517 P.2d 549, 553-554 (Utah 1973)(Crockett, J.
concurring, joined by Ellett, J., and Henriod, J.)*
Federalist reliance on local government and limitation of
federalized government is reflected in the differences between state
and federal constitutions.

State constitutions are tailored to the

regions they govern; they are detail€»d and specific; they are
dynamic.

On the other hand, the federal constitution is uniform,

general, and unchanging.

Compare the frequently amended Utah

Constitution with the federal constitution.

See also Utah Code Ann,

section 63-54-1 et sea. (Utah Constitution Revision Study Commission
crated to study Utah Constitution, inform governor and legislature
of needed changes).
Federalism is a principle that is important in Utah.

The

people of this state historically have cherished local government
and fought to limit federal intrusion into questions of state law.
E.g. E.B. Firmage and R.C. Mangrum, Zion in the Courts, 130-260;
L.J. Arrington and D. Bitton, The Mormon Experience. 161-184. Our
state supreme court was perhaps the last state court to accept
"incorporation" of provisions of the Federal Bill of Rights.

See

e.g. Manning v. Sevier County, 517 P.2d 549, 553 (Utah
1973)(Crockett, J. concurring, joined by Ellett, J., and Henriod,
J.)(federal incorporation doctrine is disingenuous, violative of
principles of federalism; first amendment to United States
Constitution does not apply to state actors).
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The Utah Constitution originally came into force in 1896.
Constitution of Utah, Article XXIV, §16.
markedly to accommodate changing times.

Since then, it has changed
The Constitution Revision

and Study Commission continues to monitor the need to adapt the Utah
Constitution, and the Utah legislature and Utah voters continue to
amend the Utah Constitution.

Every attorney licensed to practice in

the Utah bar is bound by oath to uphold the Utah Constitution.
In the instant case, trial counsel raised the Utah
Constitution after federal analysis was complete, in a separate
motion, memorandum and hearing.

The trial court provided a separate

ruling under the Utah Constitution.

As part of the plea bargain,

the State agreed that Mr. James could appeal the trial court's
rulings under both the Utah and Federal Constitutions (R. 114).
This Court should rule on the Utah Constitutional issues.

B. UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE FAILURE OF THE POLICE TO INFORM
MR. JAMES OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS AT THE OUTSET OF THE INTERROGATION,
AND RECORD THE INTERROGATION REQUIRES THE SUPPRESSION OF ALL OF MR.
JAMES' STATEMENTS.
Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides,
"The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself[.]"

Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6 (2)(c) also provides, "No

person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself[.]"
The requirement that the police inform defendants of their
Miranda rights and obtain waivers of those rights prior to custodial
interrogation should be explicitly adopted under Article I section
12.

Utah courts historically have recognized that Miranda-like
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warnings are necessary to protect fundamental constitutional
rights.

For instance, in State v. Assenberg, 244 P. 1027 (Utah

1926), the court reversed a criminal conviction for involuntary
manslaughter because the trial court had admitted into evidence at
the criminal trial the statements made by the defendant when he was
examined und€»r oath at a coronor's inquest.

Without specifying any

constitutional basis, the court stated,
In the instant case the accident which
caused the death occurred on the evening of June
1, 1925. Appellant was on that same evening
placed under arrest and lodged in the county jail
and remained there until the date of the
inquest. While it is true no formal charge had
been filed against him accusing him of crime,
nevertheless he was, to all practical purposes,
under arrest for the commission of the offense
for which he was later tried and convicted. He
was a young man, 19 years of age, was without
knowledge of his legal rights, and, so far as
appears from the record, he had not consulted
with nor had he the benefit of the advice of
counsel. He was not cautioned as to his right to
answer questions nor of his privilege to refuse
to testify. Neither was he cautioned that any
statement made by him at the time could or might
be used against him in a subsequent prosecution.
He was not subpoenaed by any process issued by
the coroner and did not attend the inquest in
answer to any legal process issued by the coronor
or other official. It appears without dispute
that the deputy sheriff simply stated to him to
come and go with the officer, and he was by the
deputy sheriff conveyed to the place of hearing.
Under that state of facts, can it be said that
the statements made by the appellant were
voluntarily made? We think not.
Id. at 1028 (emphasis added).
The majority of the court assumed the applicability of the
Miranda requirements and exclusionary rule in Sandy City v. Larson.
733 P.2d 137 (Utah 1987).

The court applied the Miranda warnings
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requirement under Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution in
Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1170-1171 (Utah 1983).
Under Article I section 12 and earner, Miranda warnings are required
when the interrogation becomes custodial or accusatory in light of
the following considerations: (1) the site of the interrogation; (2)
whether the investigation is focused on the accused; (3) whether the
objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and
form of the interrogation."
omitted).

earner, 664 P.2d at 1171 (citation

The protection provided by the earner decision is broader

than the protection of federal cases interpreting Miranda, which
require the warnings only if the defendant is in custody and
interrogated.

See Berkemer v. McCartv, 469 U.S. 420, 434

(1984)(discussing custody); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 434
(1984)(discussing interrogation).
In In Re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988),
in interpreting the Attorney General's Subpoena Powers Act, the
court adopted warnings patterned after Miranda in order to protect
the privilege against self-incrimination provided by Article I
section 12 and the fifth amendment.

Id. at 647-49.

The court noted

coercive nature of incommunicado interrogations, which raised
self-incrimination concerns, and prompted the court to adopt
Miranda-like warnings.
This Court should follow these precedents and hold that the
trial court was incorrect in ruling that Mr. James7 rights under the
Utah Constitution were not violated because the environment during
the interrogation was not "accusatorial." (R. 108). At the time of
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the interrogation, Mr. James was charged with the offense and in
jail.

Under earner, the interrogation was accusatorial, rather than

investigatory, and the police owed Mr. James a Miranda warning at
the outset of the interrogation.
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
This Court should further hold under Article I section 7 of
the Utah Constitution that when the police inexcuseably fail to
record custodial interrogations or otherwise fail to provide a
reliable record of the interrogations, the fruits of the
interrogations are inadmissible.

As Texas courts have recognized

for years, "[0]ral confessions of guilt, or oral admissions against
interest, made by one in custody are inadmissible evidence because
they are so liable to be misunderstood, so easily fabricated, and so
hard to be contradicted.

See Gay v. State, 2 Tex. App. 127 (1877),

and Rilev v. State, 4 Tex.App. 538 (1878)."

Shiflet v. State, 732

S.W.2d 622, 623 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985).
The Utah Supreme Court's Carter decision, discussed supra,
does not specify a state or federal constitutional basis for its
mandate that the police create reliable records of confessions.
However, there are precedents under the State Constitution which
call for this rule.

For instance, in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774

(Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court, dealing in the context of
eyewitness identification, held that the Utah Constitution's due
process provision requires greater scrutiny for the reliability of
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that kind of evidence.

Id. at 780.

Following Ramirez in the

context of this case, this Court should first recognize that
unrecorded confessions, like eye-witness identification evidence,
are unreliable, and yet highly impressive to jurors.
Spano. supra.

Cf. e.g.

This Court should enforce the Utah due process

provision by holding that the unrecorded statements of Mr. James are
inadmissible because they are not reliable.
In In Re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988),
in construing the Attorney General's Subpoena Powers Act to avoid
state and federal constitutional concerns, the court required that
copies of all transcripts of investigative testimony be filed with
the court, noting that this requirement would facilitate judicial
review of compliance with the Miranda-like warning requirement.
at 654 and n.24.

Id.

Following In Re Criminal Investigation, this

Court's adoption of a recording requirement under the State
Constitution will facilitate judicial enforcement of the rights at
stake in custodial interrogations.

See also Foote v. Board of

Pardons. 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991)("[T]he mandate of article I
section 7 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah Constitution is
comprehensive in its application to all activities of state
government.

It is the province of the judiciary to assure that a

claim of denial of due process by an arm of government be heard,
and, if justified, that it be vindicated.").

C. ELSTAD IS INCONSISTENT WITH ESTABLISHED UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
In addition to ruling that Mr. James' right to Miranda
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warnings under Article I section 12 was violated, this Court should
presume in this case that Mr. James7 unwarned admission tainted his
purported Miranda waiver and subsequent confession obtained after
the police belatedly gave him the Miranda warnings.

See Oregon v.

Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318-364 (dissenting opinion of Justice
Brennan).

Such a presumption reflects common sense.

[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of
the bag by confessing, no matter what the
inducement, he is never thereafter free of the
psychological and practical disadvantages of
having confessed. He can never get the cat back
in the bag. The secret is out for good. In such
a sense, a later confession always may be looked
upon as a fruit of the first.
United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947).

Numerous courts

have recognized the coercive effect of unwarned statements on
subsequent post-Miranda statements, and have required the
prosecution to rebut the presumption of coercion cast on the
post-Miranda statements with evidence in addition to the giving of
Miranda warnings.

See Justice Brennan's Elstad dissent, 470 U.S.

322-323 and nn. 3-6.
Such a rule would simplify police procedure and
adjudication of Article I section 12 rights.

Cf. Justice Stevens'

Elstad dissent, 470 U.S. at 364-372.
Important deterrence of police misconduct is served through
requiring the State to overcome the presumption of coercion.

As

Justice Brennan explained in Elstad, professional interrogators know
that once the "cat is out of the bag," it is much easier to obtain
full confessions, even if the subsequent confessions are preceded by
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warnings.

Police must be encouraged to inform citizens of their

rights up front, and to scrupulously honor those rights in all
instances.

470 U.S. 328-332.

The Elstad opinion is inconsistent with Miranda, and
threatens to blur the bright line rules established in that
cornerstone of constitutional law governing police conduct.

E.g.

Kamisar, "Heavy Blow Delivered by Miranda Decisions," 7 National Law
Journal, September 2, 1985 S-22, column 2.

This Court should reject

this confusing precedent under the Utah Constitution.

Cf. e.g.

State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-473 (Utah 1990)(plurality)(court
reviews confusion in federal search and seizure law, and departs
therefrom under simplier state constitutional analysis).
Adopting a rebuttable presumption of taint from unwarned
statements will encourage police officers to take their Miranda
responsibilities seriously, and is thus consistent with earner and
other precedents under Article I section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, which require the government to treat those subject to
the State's overwhelming powers of accusation with honesty and
fairness.

See State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, 184 and 192 (Utah

1943)(plurality)(under Article I section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, "'Although no unbending, universal rule can be laid
down by which to determine whether subsequent confessions in a
criminal case are admissible, when the former confessions were
obtained by improper influences, yet in each case the inquiry must
be whether, considering the degree of intelligence of the prisoner,
and all the attendant circumstances, it is affirmatively shown that
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the effect of the primary improper inducement was so entirely
obliterated from his mind that the subsequent confession could not
have been in the slightest degree influenced by it; and if there be
any doubt on this question, it must be resolved in favor of the
prisoner, and the confession must be excluded.'")(citations
omitted).

See also State v. Ruggeri. 429 P.2d 969 (Utah 1967)(under

Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution, it was improper to
fail to warn a witness at a grand jury proceedings that he was the
target of the investigation); In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d
633 (Utah 1988)(under Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution,
in exercising subpoena powers, the attorney general must give
Miranda-like warnings).

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court's rulings
admitting Mr. James' statements, which were taken in violation of
Article I sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution, the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the
Miranda decision.
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APPENDIX 1
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions

TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment V to the Constitution of the United States provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
Amendment X to the Constitution of the United States provides:
The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.
Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2.
Representatives shall be apportioned among
the several States according to their respective
numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But
when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and
Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of

the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one
years of age, and citizens of the United States,
or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3.
No person shall be a Senator or
Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or
under any State, who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer
of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature or as an executive or judicial
officer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same or
given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each
House, remove such disability.
Section 4.
The validity of the public debt of the
United States, authorized by law, including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither
the United States nor any State shall assume or
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5.
The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article.
Amendment XXIV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
Section 1.
The right of citizens of the United States
to vote in any primary or other election for
President or Vice President, for electors for
President or Vice President, or for Senator or

Representative in Congress, shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or any State by
reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other
tax.
Section 2.
The Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
Rule 52. Findings by the Court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury,
the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon,
and judgment shall be entered pursuant to
Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth
the findings of fact and conclusions of law which

constitute the grounds of its action. Requests
for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge the credibility of the witnesses. The
findings of a master, to the extent that the
court adopts them, shall be considered as the
findings of the court. It will be sufficient if
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are
stated orally and recorded in open court
following the close of the esvidence or appear in
an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the
court. The trial court need not enter findings
of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written
statement of the ground for its decision on all
motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b),
56, and 59 when the motion is based on more than
one ground.

APPENDIX 2
Trial Court's Oral Findings

THE COURT:

NOW LET ME GET THAT STRAIGHT.

WHEN HE WAS ASKED ABOUT EMPLOYMENT, THAT'S WHEN HE
VOLUNTEERED THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE BURGLARIES.
MS. BOWMAN:

THAT'S WHAT HIS POSITION IS,

THE COURT:

I HAVE TO READ THAT CASE.

YES.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM WITH READING MIRANDA
BEFORE THEY START QUESTIONING?
SECONDS.

IT TAKES ABOUT TWO

WHY GO THROUGH ALL THIS?

AND THEN AFTER HE

MAKES THE ADMISSION, THEN WE GET TO THIS PROBLEM HERE
TODAY.
MR. MORGAN:

WELL, YOUR HONOR, THE RECENT

CASES-- THERE'S ONE EVEN MORE RECENT THAN OREGON V.
ELSTAD WHICH SAYS THAT THE PURPOSE OF MIRANDA IS THE
INTERROGATION, AND STATEMENTS SUCH AS BOOKING QUESTIONS
AND THINGS OF THAT NATURE ARE NOT COVERED BY MIRANDA;
IT'S NOT DESIGNED TO ELICIT A RESPONSE.
THE COURT:

THE PURPOSE HERE, THOUGH, WAS TO

SEE IF THEY COULDN'T GET A CONFESSION.

THAT'S WHAT THE

PURPOSE WAS, WAS IT NOT, WHEN THEY BROUGHT HIM INTO THE
BOOKING OFFICE:
NEAREST RELATIVE.

NAME, ADDRESS, PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT,
BUT THERE IS ONE FURTHER POINT.

MR. MORGAN:
HONOR.
DO THAT.

THEY DID THAT, THOUGH, YOUR

THEY HAD THE MIRANDA READY.

THEY WERE ABOUT TO

THEY HAD NOT ASKED A SINGLE QUESTION.

THERE

uortfo

1

IS NOTHING THAT THESE PEOPLE HAD DONE THAT IS

2

CONTRARY—

3

THE COURT:

I'LL READ THAT CASE, BUT,

4

FRANKLY, I'M INCLINED TO SUPPRESS THE CONFESSION.

5

WOULD HAVE ONLY TAKEN THEM ABOUT A SECOND TO READ THAT

6

WHEN THEY BROUGHT HIM DOWN TO INVESTIGATE; ASK ABOUT

7

THE CRIME.

8

BECAUSE THEY'VE ALREADY GOT THAT

9
10

THAT'S THE FIRST THING THEY OUGHT TO DO,
INFORMATION.

WHY DO THEY NEED TO ASK THAT?

ALL THEY NEED

TO DO IS LOOK AT THE BOOKING SHEET.

11

MS. BOWMAN:

12

THE COURT:

13

IT

YOUR HONOR, I HAVE BOTH C O P I E S —
LET ME LOOK AT THESE CASES.

BUT

THAT'S WHERE I'M COMING FROM.

14

MS. BOWMAN:

15

WANT US TO DO A MEMO?

16

THE COURT:

WHAT'S YOUR PLEASURE?

NO.

JUST GIVE ME THE TWO CASES.

17

THERE'S NO USE SPENDING TIME ON IT.

18

GIVE ME THE CASES AND I'LL READ THEM.

19

MS. BOWMAN:

DO YOU

YOU'RE BOTH BUSY.

I DIDN'T BRING ELSTAD. BUT

20

SAMPSON DOES DEAL WITH-- SAMPSON IS IN A MORE

21

RESTRICTIVE LIGHT.

22

THE COURT:

I DON'T THINK THIS FALLS IN THE

23

CATEGORY OF BOOKING.

24

DOWN FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF INTERROGATING HIM ABOUT

25

THE CRIME.

THERE IS A CATEGORY-- BROUGHT HIM

WHEN THEY BROUGHT HIM THERE, THE FIRST
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THING THEY SHOULD HAVE SAID IS THIS IS WHAT WE'RE HERE
FOR.

YOU READ HIM MIRANDA, AND THEN THERE WOULD BE NO

PROBLEM.
MR. MORGAN:

THE OREGON CASE, YOUR HONOR,

JUST INTRODUCED TO YOU, SAYS THAT MIRANDA IS A
PROPHYLACTIC MEASURE, NOT SOMETHING THAT PREVENTS
PEOPLE FROM TALKING.

IT IS JUST SOMETHING THAT GETS

YOU TO THE POINT OF LETTING THE DEFENDANT KNOW WHAT HIS
RIGHTS ARE.
THE REAL ISSUE IS, IS IT VOLUNTARY UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES?

AND THERE'S NO QUESTION IN THIS CASE

THAT IT WAS A VOLUNTARY STATEMENT, AND THE ONLY
QUESTION IS WHETHER IT'S ADMISSIBLE BECAUSE OF LACK OF
MIRANDA.
5

THE COURT:

I UNDERSTAND THAT.

6

MR. MORGAN:

AND IT WOULD BE THE UNDERLYING

7

VOLUNTARINESS OF THE CONFESSION.

8

OF-THE-POISONOUS-TREE PROBLEM.

9

AFTER MIRANDA, AND WHETHER WHAT WAS SAID AFTER MIRANDA

0

WAS GIVEN VOLUNTARILY; WHICH IT WAS, AND IT IS

1

CIRCUMSCRIBED BY MIRANDA ADMONITIONS, AND KNOWING

2

THOSE, THAT THE PERSON TALKS.

3

WITH THAT.

4
5

I

AND MIRANDA IS GOING OUT THE WINDOW SLOWLY.

THE COURT:

THIS IS NOT A FRUITIT'S WHAT WAS SAID

THERE'S NOTHING WRONG

BUT THE FACT REMAINS, IN THIS

CASE, THE CONFESSION WAS MADE BEFORE THE MIRANDA WAS
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1

GIVEN, SO YOU CAN'T THEN COME BACK AND SAY:

2

GAVE THE MIRANDA, GOT THE SAME CONFESSION.

3

MR. MORGAN:

4

THE COURT:

5

MS. BOWMAN:

THAT'S WHAT OREGON HOLDS.
WELL, THEY MAY HAVE HELD THAT.
I TAKE ISSUE WITH THE

6

DESCRIPTION OF VOLUNTARY.

7

WHY HE'S BROUGHT OUT.

8
9

THE COURT:

WELL, I

HE'S BROUGHT OUT; NOT TOLD

I'M INCLINED TO GO ALONG WITH

YOU, AND BECAUSE IT'S ONLY-- MIRANDA MAY BE ON ITS WAY

10

OUT, BUT UNTIL IT IS, AND WHEN THEY BRING THEM DOWN FOR

11

INTERROGATION, THE LEAST THEY CAN DO IS TAKE TWO

12

MINUTES, OR WHATEVER IT TAKES, TO READ THE MIRANDA

13

RIGHTS A N D —

14

SO, DESPITE THAT CASE, I'M INCLINED

MR. MORGAN:

TO—

YOUR HONOR, THERE'S ONE OTHER

15

CASE I WOULD LIKE TO BRING TO THE COURT'S ATTENTION,

16

STATE V. GINSHOP, AS WELL.

17

THE COURT:

AS I SAY, BASED UPON MY

18

KNOWLEDGE AT THIS TIME, AND I CAN BE CORRECTED, BUT I'M

19

INCLINED TO SUPPRESS IT, SUPPRESS THE CONFESSION.

20

MR. MORGAN:

YOU'LL GET THOSE TWO CASES.

21

THE COURT:

OKAY.

22

MS. BOWMAN:

HOW DO YOU WANT TO HANDLE THIS?

FINE.

23

I DON'T THINK WE HAVE TIME TO FINISH TODAY.

24

WE'RE GOING TO SET ANOTHER DATE AFTER TODAY?

25

THE COURT:

I THINK

I DON'T HAVE ANOTHER DATE DOWN.
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APPENDIX 3
Trial Court's Oral Ruling

1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 1992; P.M.

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

3
4

THE COURT:

STATE VS. EDWARD JAMES,

911900562.

5

MAY THE RECORD INDICATE THE DEFENDANT IS

6

PRESENT REPRESENTED BY MRS. BOWMAN AND THE STATE IS

7

REPRESENTED BY MR. MORGAN.

8

AND I GUESS YOU WANT TO KNOW WHAT MY RULING

9

WAS ON THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS.

0

CASES, IT APPEARS TO ME, EVEN THOUGH MY FEELINGS WERE

1

TO THE CONTRARY, I THINK I OUGHT TO SUPPRESS.

2

THE CASES HOLD MR. MORGAN'S POSITION.

3

VERY GOOD ABOUT IT, BUT I THINK THAT'S WHAT THE LAW IS

4

TODAY.

5

MS. BOWMAN:

AFTER READING THE

I THINK

AND I DON'T FEEL

WELL, I THINK WE WILL CERTAINLY

6

NEED A WRITTEN RULING WITH THE RATIONALE SET OUT FOR

7

PURPOSES OF APPEAL, YOUR HONOR.

8

MR. MORGAN:

I WILL PREPARE A FINDINGS OF

0

MR. MORGAN:

AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

1

THE COURT:

AS I EXPRESSED BEFORE, MY

9

2

FACT.

OPINION—

3
4
5

MS. BOWMAN:

IS IT ELSTAD THAT YOU'RE RELYING

MR. MORGAN:

IT WAS.

ON?
AND STATE VS. BISHOP,
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1

YOUR HONOR.
MS. BOWMAN:

2

THIS CASE THEY 'RE TALKING ABOUT,

3

I BELIEVE , IMPROPER MISCONDUCT,- IF THERE IS NOT

4

IMPROPER COERCION TACTICS

5

IN ONE OF THOSE CATEGORIES.
THE COURT:

6

O R — SO YOU COULD HAVE FOUND

IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, IT

7

APPEARS THAT HE VOLUNTARILY MADE THE STATEMENT, EVEN

8

THOUGH I AM OF THE OPINION THEY OUGHT TO READ THE

9

MIRANDA WARNING AT THE TIME THEY BRING HIM DOWN FOR THE

10

INTERVIEW.

11

I'LL PREPARE A LITTLE MEMORANDUM AND GIVE

12

THAT TO YOU, BUT AFTER READING THAT CASE, THOSE CASES,

13

OVER THE WEEKEND, I CAME TO THAT CONCLUSION, DESPITE

14

HOW I FEEL.

15

MR. MORGAN:

I WILL HAVE THOSE PRESENTED TO

16

THE COURT IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS.

17

WE WOULD NEED A TRIAL DATE.

18

THE COURT:

19

OKAY.

HOW SOON DO YOU WANT TO

TRY THIS CASE?
MS. BOWMAN:

20

YOUR HONOR, I UNDERSTAND HE'S IN

21

CUSTODY, BUT I. HAVE A FULL CALENDAR THROUGH THE END OF

22

MAY, PRETTY FULL INTO JUNE.

23
24
25

THE COURT:
TRY IT?

ALL RIGHT.

WHEN DO YOU WANT TO

YOU TELL ME.
MS. BOWMAN:

I COULD DO IT AFTER JUNE 24TH.
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APPENDIX 4
Trial Court's Written Findings and Conclusions

Thirc Juaic:ai J.itnct

DAVID E. YOCOM
County Attorney
B. KENT MORGAN, Bar No. 3945
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900

MAY 2 4 1991
,

SALT y Kb'COi/
Deputy ClwfK

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

EDWARD H. JAMES,
Defendant

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANTS MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

Case No. 911900562FS
Before Hon. John A. Rokich

A hearing on Defendants Motion to Suppress came before this
Court on May 8, 1991, the State being represented by its counsel,
B. Kent Morgan, Deputy County Attorney, and the defendant being
present and represented

by his counsel, Elizabeth A. Bowman,

Esq., and the Court having taken testimony in the matter, having
heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the authorities submitted
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters
its:
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Defendant was arrested and booked into the Salt Lake
County Jail on the evening of March 28, 1991 for the offense of
Burglary, a Second Degree Felony in violation of §76-6-202 U.C.A.
and Theft, a Class A Misdemeanor alleged to have been committed
at 355 North 700 West, Salt Lake County, Utah on the same day as
his arrest.
2. From the time of his arrest until the interview conducted
the following morning at 10:14 O'clock A. M., the defendant was
not questioned by the police about any matter.
the defendant

invoke his

right

to remain

At no time did

silent

or request

counsel.
3. On March 29, 1991, the defendant was called out from the
general

population

into

the

booking

area

of

the

jail

and

confronted by Salt Lake City Police Detectives Gary Newren and
Steve Cheever who immediately announced they were police officers
whose purpose was to discuss the burglary committed the previous
day.
4. The detectives then asked the defendant general questions
about his identity for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
correct person was being interviewed.
5. Detective

Cheever questioned

the defendant

about his

present employment to which the defendant responded that he was
presently unemployed, and then, after a pause, volunteered that
during times when he was unemployed was when he got into trouble,
that this is when he gets things into his head and does them, and
admitted to the burglary.
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6. Detectives Newren and Cheever interrupted the defendant
and read him his rights pursuant to Miranda

v. Arizona,

to which

the defendant responded that he understood each of those rights
and agreed to speak to the Detectives about the burglary.

The

defendant

the

thereupon

gave

a

detailed

confession

about

burglary.
7. No coercion or deception of any kind was exercised by the
Detectives in order to induce the defendant to speak with the
police.

Having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters
its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The mere fact that the defendant was in jail and called
into the booking area does not render any statement made in
response to police questioning involuntary under the totality of
the circumstances, but rather is only a factor to be considered
among the other circumstances of the interview.
uncontradicted

testimony

Based on the

of the Detectives who conducted

the

interview that the defendant freely volunteered the information
requested

and was subjected to neither coercion, physical or

psychological, or induced to speak as a result of promises or
deception

of

any

kind,

the

statements were voluntarily

Court

concludes

the

defendant's

given under the totality

of the

circumstances.
2. The police are not required to give Miranda

admonitions

to a defendant who is in custody prior to asking routine booking
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questions which the police have no reason to know are reasonably
likely

to

elicit

an

incriminating

elicited prior to giving Miranda

response.

The

questions

admonitions in this case were

merely requesting biographical datci to assure the interviewing
detectives that they were about to question the right suspect.
3. Notwithstanding any unwarned but nonetheless voluntary
statement made prior to the Miretnda warnings in this case, even
if the unwarned statements resulted from interrogation within the
meaning of Miranda,

there is no constitutional requirement that

this Court suppress the defendant's post-Miranda statements.

NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
Defendants Motion to Suppress is denied.

<sl

DATED this o(T

day of May, 1991.

fJL-*&Jd.
District Court Judge

UU087

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Page 5
MAILING/DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of
the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 South,
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this JX^

day of May, 1991.

